Knowledge extraction, typically studied in the classical setting, is at the heart of several cryptographic protocols. The prospect of quantum computers forces us to revisit the concept of knowledge extraction in the quantum setting.
Introduction
passed the test or not (the classical receiver will never pass the test) and, (ii) second, the sender should not know whether the receiver obtained the witness.
A first attempt to tackle both of these issues is to use a secure two party computation protocol where only the receiver receives the output; we later instantiate this with secure function evaluation [GHV , BCPR a] that guarantees security against quantum adversaries. The extraction protocol proceeds as follows: the sender sends key k and the receiver responds back with y ∈ Y. The sender then sends the challenge bit w. Instead of the receiver answering with either (b, x b ) or (d, u) ; it inputs this to the two party secure computation protocol. The sender, on the other hand, inputs the witness w along with trapdoor td associated with k. The functionality associated with the protocol checks if (b, x b ) is valid if w 0 or if (d, u) if w 1. If so, it outputs the witness. This ensures that the sender does not know whether the test passed or not and at the same time, the extractor receives the witness since it does pass the test. In fact, we can formalize this argument and show that indeed, extractability is satisfied. To argue zero-knowledge, we need to rely upon the security property of NTCFs which suggest that we need to ability to extract a valid (b, x b ) and a valid (d, u) ; since the receiver inputs these values only into the two-party secure computation protocol, it would seem that we need the ability to extract from this protocol. However, the instantiation of the two-party secure computation protocol we use does not guarantee efficient extraction. Thus, we circumvent this problem by adding an quantum-secure extractable commitment before the secure two-party computation protocol begins. The receiver instead of feeding (b, x b ) or (d, u) directly into the two-party protocol, it commits using an extractable commitment scheme [PW ] ; an extractable commitment allows for a rewinding extractor to extract from the committer. This enables the zero-knowledge simulator to be able to extract both (b, x b ) and (d, u) using an extractable commitment scheme if indeed the classical receiver passes the test and we use this to contradict the security of NTCFs. Otherwise, if the test did not pass, we can invoke the security of the two-party protocol to argue that the receiver never receives the witness. There are a couple of issues that we defer to the technical sections: firstly, a classical adversary can pass the test of [BCM + ] with probability / but we require that the classical adversary passes it with only negligible probability and secondly, we would need an extratable commitment scheme that is quantum secure; we instantiate the construction of extractable commitment scheme of [PW ] with perfectly binding commitments that satisfies computational hiding property against quantum adversaries.
QZK with classical provers. We go from cQEXT to quantum zero-knowledge argument with classical verifier by the FLS trick [FLS ] . The argument system has phases: ( ) prover and verifier engage in a cQEXT protocol, with the prover taking the role of the receiver and the verifier that of the sender, ( ) prover and verfier engage in a witness indistinguishable (WI) proof system protocol. In the WI phase, instead of showing that z ∈ L, the prover will show a statement of the form (z ∈ L) (td ′ td), where td is a trapdoor that can be extracted from the verifier in the cQEXT protocol. BY security of cQEXT, the adversarial classical prover cannot find the trapdoor td, so it will not be able to prove anything in the WI round unless it has a witness to the statement z ∈ L. However, a quantum simulator can first extract td from the cQEXT protocol, and then use the trapdoor as the witness in the WI rounds.
To implement this idea, we need to deal with a possibly malicious sender that engaged in the cQEXT protocol, and not just a semi-malicious one. To do this, we again use extractable commitments after the cQEXT protocol is completed, in order for the prover to commit to the witness that it will use in the WI. After this commitment is sent, the verifier is required to reveal all the random coins it used in the cQEXT, so that the prover can check that the verifier behaved honestly in the cQEXT. If this is indeed the case, then the prover proceeds with the WI stage, othwerwise it aborts. The malicious verifier could try aborting in the cQEXT protocol, but our construction satisfies a stronger extractability property: a semi-malicious sender cannot detect if it is interacting with an extractor or a verifier even if it is allowed to abort. If the verifier aborts in the cQEXT, then the simulator would abort the same way that the honest prover would. On the other hand, if the verifier completes the protocol, it will have to reveal the random coins of the cQEXT protocol. At this point, both the simulator and the prover can abort if the verifier does not provide valid random coins.
Quantum extraction with security against quantum receivers: Overview. To construct a quantum extraction protocol secure against quantum receivers (qQEXT), we consider a fully homomorphic encryption qFHE scheme having that allows for public homomorphic evaluation of quantum circuits. For the current discussion, we assume that qFHE is -circular insecure (we show later how to replace this with lockable obfuscation): that is, given qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SK 2 ) (i.e., encryption of SK 2 under PK 1 ), qFHE.Enc(PK 2 , SK 1 ), where (PK 1 , SK 1 ) and (PK 2 , SK 2 ) are independently generated public key-secret key pairs, we can recover SK 1 and SK 2 . Using this, we attempt to construct qQEXT protocols as follows:
• The sender, on input instance z and witness w, sends three ciphertexts: CT 1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , td), CT 2 ← qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , w) and CT 3 ← qFHE.Enc(PK 2 , SK 1 ).
• The receiver sends td ′ .
• If td ′ td then the sender outputs SK 2 .
A quantum extractor with non black box access to the private (quantum) state of S, after receiving CT 1 , CT 2 and CT 3 , encrypts the private (quantum) state and homomorphically evaluates S on CT 1 and the result is qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SK 2 ). Now, that the extractor has both qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SK 2 ) and qFHE.Enc(PK 2 , SK 1 ), it can recover SK 1 , SK 2 using the -circular insecurity of qFHE. Now it can decrypt CT 1 to recover the witness w! This approach sidesteps the quantum rewinding issues mentioned earlier, as we never require the sender to rewind to a previous state in order to recover the witness. The ability that the extractor recovers the witness is not alone sufficient; we need to argue that the transcript generated by the extractor is indistinguishable from the one generated during the interaction of the sender and the honest receiver. However, the transcript generated by the extractor is encrypted under the public key PK 1 of qFHE. Luckily, the extractor does recover SK 1 and thus, can decrypt the encrypted final state of the sender to obtain the transcript of the protcol . This still does not guarantee the indistinguishability of transcripts generated by the extractor and the the transcripts generated by the honest receiver. This is because, the transcript output by the extracor contains SK 2 as the third message but not the one generated by the honest receiver. In particular, we need a mechanism where the sender does not know whether the receiver received SK 2 or not. We already encountered a similar issue when we were devising cQEXT protocols; we solved the earlier issue using secure two-party computation (instantiated using secure function evaluation) and we use the same solution here as well. Instead of the receiver sending td ′ directly to S, it instead feeds this into the two-party protocol which checks if td ′ td and if so releases SK 2 to the receiver. That is, we have the following modified template.
• The sender and the receiver executes a secure two-party computation protocol, where the receiver feeds td ′ and the sender feeds in (td, w). After the protocol finishes, the receiver recovers w if td ′ td.
We can argue that this still allows for extraction -the extractor now computes the two-party protocol homomorphically -moreover, the secure computation protocol guarantees indistinguishability of the transcripts. Arguing zero-knowledge involves more challenges: the adversarial receiver could "maul" the ciphertext it receives in the first round into the messages of the secure two-party computation protocol. To prevent this, we require the receiver to commit to td ′ in parallel with the secure computation protocol and furthermore, the randomness used in this commitment is committed even before it sees the first message. Using this, we demonstrate a quantum simulator that demonstrates the quantum zero-knowledge property of the protocol.
While the above protocol is a candidate for quantum extraction protocol secure against quantum receivers; it is still unsatisfactory since we assume a quantum FHE scheme satisfying -circular insecurity.We show how to replace -circular insecure QFHE with any QFHE scheme (satisfying some mild properties already satisfied by existing candidates) and lockable obfuscation for classical circuits. A lockable obfuscation scheme is an obfuscation scheme for a specific class of functionalities called compute-and-compare functionalities; a compute-and-compare functionality is parameterized by C, α (lock), β such that on input x, it outputs β if C(x) α. As long as α is sampled uniformly at random and independently of C, lockable obfuscation completely hides the circuit C, α and β. The idea to replace -circular insecure QFHE with lockable obfuscation is as follows: obfuscate the circuit, with secret key SK 2 , ciphertext qFHE.Enc(SK 2 , r) hardwired, that takes as input qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SK 2 ), decrypts it to obtain SK ′ 2 , then decrypts qFHE.Enc(SK 2 , r) to obtain r ′ and outputs SK 1 if r ′ r. If the adversary does not obtain qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SK 2 ) then we can first invoke the security of lockable obfuscation to remove SK 1 from the obfuscated circuit and then it can replace qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , w) with qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , ⊥). The idea of using fully homomorphic encryption along with lockable obfuscation to achieve non black box extraction was introduced, in the classical setting, by [BKP ] .
Unlike our cQEXT construction, the non black box technique used for qQEXT does not directly give us a constant round quantum zero-knowledge protocol for NP. This is because an adversarial verifier that aborts can distinguish between the extractor or the honest prover (receiver in qQEXT). The main issue is that the extractor runs the verifier homomorphically, so it cannot detect if the verifier aborted at any point in the protocol without decrypting. But if the verifier aborted, the extractor wouldn't be able to decrypt in the first place -it could rewind but then this would destroy the initial quantum auxiliary state.
.
Related Work
Quantum Rewinding. Watrous [Wat b] introduced quantum analogue of the rewinding technique. Later, Unruh [Unr ] introduced yet another notion of quantum rewinding with the purpose of constructing quantum zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. Unruh's rewinding does have extractability, but it requires that the underlying protocol satisfy strict soundness. Furthermore, the probability that the extractor succeeds is not negligibly close to 1. The work of [ARU ] shows that relative to an oracle, many classical zero-knowledge protocols are quantum insecure, and that the strict soundness condition from [Unr ] is necessary in order for a sigma protocol to be a quantum proofs of knowledge.
Quantum and Classical Zero-Knowledge. Zero-knowledge against quantum adversaries was first studied by Watrous [Wat b]. He showed how the GMW protocol [GMW ] for graphcolorability is still zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers. Other work [HKSZ , CCKV , JKMR b, Kob , Mat , Unr ] has extended the study of classical protocols that are quantum zero-knowledge, and more recently, Broadbent et al. [BJSW ] extended the notion of zero-knowledge to QMA languages. By using ideas from [Mah b] to classically verify quantum computation, the protocol in [BJSW ] was adapted to obtained classical argument systems for quantum computation in [VZ ] . All known protocols, with non-negligible soundness error, take non-constant rounds.
On the other hand, zero knowledge proof and argument systems have been extensively studied in classical cryptography. In particular, a series of recent works [BCPR b, BBK + , BKP , BKP ] resolved the round complexity of zero knowledge argument systems.
Preliminaries
We denote the security parameter by λ. We denote (classical) computational indistiguishability of two distributions D 0 and D 1 by D 0 ≈ c,ε D 1 . In the case when ε is negligible, we drop ε from this notation.
. Learning with Errors
In this work, we are interested in the decisional learning with errors (LWE) problem. This problem, parameterized by n, m, q, χ, where n, m, q ∈ N, and for a distribution χ supported over Z is to distinguish between the distributions (A, As+e) and
and u ← Z m×1 q . Typical setting of m is n log(q), but we also consider m poly(n log(q)). We base the security of our constructions on the quantum hardness of learning with errors problem.
Notation and General Definitions
For completeness, we present some of the basic quantum definitions, for more details see [NC ] . C 2 is called a qubit. For any n ∈ N, we refer to the quantum states over H (C 2 ) ⊗n as n-qubit quantum states. To perform a standard basis measurement on a qubit means projecting the qubit into {|0 , |1 }. A quantum register is a collection of qubits. A classical register is a quantum register that is only able to store qubits in the computational basis.
A unitary quantum circuit is a sequence of unitary operations (unitary gates) acting on a fixed number of qubits. Measurements in the standard basis can be performed at the end of the unitary circuit. A (general) quantum circuit is a unitary quantum circuit with 2 additional operations: (1) a gate that adds an ancilla qubit to the system, and (2) a gate that discards (trace-out) a qubit from the system. A quantum polynomial-time algorithm (QPT) is a uniform collection of quantum circuits {C n } n∈N .
Quantum Computational Indistinguishability.
When we talk about quantum distinguishers, we need the following definitions, which we take from [Wat b].
Definition (Indistinguishable collections of states). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1} * , let p : N → N be a polynomially bounded function, and let ρ x and σ x be p(|x|)-qubit states. We say that {ρ x } x∈I and {σ x } x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable collections of quantum states if for every QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded q : N → N, and any auxiliary q(|x|)-qubits state ν, and for all x ∈ I, we have that
for some negligible function ǫ : N → [0, 1]. We use the following notation ρ x ≈ Q,ǫ σ x and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
Definition (Indistinguishability of channels). Let I be an infinite subset I ⊂ {0, 1} * , let p, q : N → N be polynomially bounded functions, and let D x , F x be quantum channels mapping p(|x|)-qubit states to q(|x|)-qubit states. We say that {D x } x∈I and {F x } x∈I are quantum computationally indistinguishable collection of channels if for every QPT E that outputs a single bit, any polynomially bounded t : N → N, any p(|x|) + t(|x|)-qubit quantum state ρ, and for all x ∈ I, we have that
for some negligible function ǫ : N → [0, 1]. We will use the following notation
and we ignore the ǫ when it is understood that it is a negligible function.
Interactive Models. We model an interactive protocol between a prover, Prover, and a verifier, Verifier, as follows. There are registers R Prover and R Verifier corresponding to the prover's and the verifier's private registers, as well as a message register, R M , which is used by both Prover and Verifier to send messages. In other words, both prover and verifier have access to the message register. We denote the size of a register R by |R| -this is the number of bits or qubits that the register can store. We will have different notions of interactive computation. Our honest parties will perform classical protocols, but the adversaries will be allowed to perform quantum protocols with classical messages.
. Classical protocol: An interactive protocol is classical if R Prover , R Verifier , and R M are classical, and Prover and Verifier can only perform classical computation.
. Quantum protocol with classical messages: An interactive protocol is quantum with classical messages if either one of R Prover or R Verifier is a quantum register, and R M is classical. Prover and Verifier can perform quantum computations if their respective private register is quantum, but they can only send classical messages.
When a protocol has classical messages, we can assume that the adversarial party will also send classical messages. This is without loss of generality, because the honest party can enforce this condition by always measuring the message register in the computational basis before proceeding with its computations.
Non Black-Box Access. Let S be a QPT party (e.g. either prover or verifier in the above descriptions) involved in specific quantum protocol. In particular, S can be seen as a collection of QPTs, S (S 1 , ..., S ℓ ), where ℓ is the number of rounds of the protocol, and S i is the quantum operation that S performs on the ith round of the protocol. We say that a QPT Q has non black-box access to S, if Q has access to an efficient classical description for the operations that S performs in each round, (S 1 , ..., S ℓ ), as well as access to the initial auxiliary inputs of S.
Interaction Channel. For a particular protocol (Prover, Verifier), the interaction between Prover and Verifier on input z induces a quantum channel E z acting on their private input states, ρ Prover and σ Verifier . We denote the view of Verifier when interacting with Prover by View Verifier Prover z, ρ Prover , Verifier (z, σ Verifier ) , and this view is defined as the verifiers output. Specifically,
From the verifier's point of view, the interaction induces the channel E z,V (σ) E z (σ ⊗ ρ Prover ) on its private input state.
Perfectly Binding Commitments
A commitment scheme consists a classical PPT algorithm Comm that takes as input security parameter 1 λ , input message x and outputs the commitment c. There are two properties that need to be satisfied by a commitment scheme: binding and hiding. In this work, we are interested in commitment schemes that are perfectly binding and computationally hiding; we define both these notions below. We adapt the definition of computational hiding to the quantum setting. Typically, commitment schemes are also associated with a opening algorithm; we don't use the opening algorithm in our work.
Definition (Noisy Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions) . Let X and Y be finite sets, let D Y be the set of distributions over Y, and let K be a finite set of keys. A collection of functions { f k,b : X → D Y } k∈K ,b∈{0,1} is noisy trapdoor claw-free if
• (Key-Trapdoor Generation):
There is a PPT Gen(1 λ ) to generate a key and a corresponding trapdoor, k, td k ← Gen(1 λ ).
• For all k ∈ K
There is also an efficient deterministic algorithm Inv, that for any y ∈
-There is an efficient deterministic checking algorithm Chk :
for some negligible function µ, and where H 2 is the Hellinger distance.
-For any k ∈ K and b ∈ {0, 1}, there exists an efficient way to prepare the superposition
• (Adaptive Hardcore Bit): for all keys k ∈ K , for some polynomially bounded w : N → N, the following holds.
-There is an efficiently computable injection J : X → {0, 1} w(λ) , that can be inverted efficiently in its range, and for which the following holds. Let
Instantiation. The work of [BCM + ] presented a construction of noisy trapdoor claw-free functions from learning with errors.
Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Quantum Homomorphic Encryption schemes have the same syntax as traditional classical homomorphic encryption schemes, but are extended to support quantum operations and to allow plaintexts and ciphertexts to be quantum states. We take our definition directly from [BJ ] .
Definition .
A quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of QPT qFHE (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) satisfying
• qFHE.Gen(1 λ ): outputs a a public and a secret key, (PK, SK), as well as a quantum state ρ evk ), which can serve as an evaluation key.
• qFHE.Enc(PK, ·) : L(M) → L(C): takes as input a qubit ρ and outputs a ciphertext σ
: takes a quantum ciphertext σ in correct, and outputs a qubit ρ in the message space L(M).
, and a ciphertext in L(C ⊗n ) and outputs a ciphertext in L(C ⊗m ), possibly consuming the evaluation key ρ evk in the proccess.
Semantic security and compactness are defined analogously to the classical setting, and we defer to [BJ ] for a definition. We require an qFHE scheme to satisfy the following properties.
(Perfect) Correctness of classical messages. We require the following properties to hold: for every quantum circuit E acting on ℓ qubits, message x, every r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) ,
• Pr[x ← qFHE.Dec(SK, qFHE.Enc(PK, x)) : (PK, SK) ← qFHE.Gen(1 λ )] 1
• Pr[qFHE.Dec(SK, qFHE.Eval(PK, CT))] ≥ 1−negl(λ), for some negligible function negl, where: ( ) (PK, SK) ← qFHE.Setup(1 λ ; r 1 ) and, ( ) σ ← qFHE.Enc(PK, x; r 2 ). The probability is defined over the randomness of the evaluation procedure.
Instantiation. The works of [Mah a, Bra b] give lattice-based candidates for quantum fully homomorphic encryption schemes; we currently do not know how to base this on learning with errors alone . There are two desirable propertiess required from the quantum FHE schemes and the works of [Mah a, Bra b] satisfy both of them. We formalize them in the lemma below.
Lemma ([Mah a, Bra b]). There is a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme that satisfies: ( ) perfect correctness of classical messages and, ( ) ciphertexts of classical poly-sized messages have a poly-sized classical description.
Quantum-Secure Function Evaluation
As a building block in our construction, we consider a secure function evaluation protocol [GHV ] for classical functionalities. A secure function evaluation protocol is a two message two party secure computation protocol; we designate the parties as sender and receiver (who receives the output of the protocol). Unlike prior works, we require the secure function evaluation protocol to be secure against polynomial time quantum adversaries.
Security. We require malicious (indistinguishability) security against a quantum adversary R and semantic security against a quantum adversary S. We define both of them below. First, we define an indistinguishability security notion against malicious R. To do that, we employ an extraction mechanism to extract R's input x * 1 . We then argue that R should not be able to distinguish whether S uses x 0 2 or x 1 2 in the protocol as long as f (
. We don't place any requirements on the computational complexity of the extraction mechanism.
Definition (Indistinguishability Security: Malicious Quantum R). Consider a secure function evaluation protocol for a functionality f between a sender S and a receiver R. We say that the secure evaluation protocol satisfies indistinguishability security against malicious R * if for every adversarial QPT R * , there is an extractor Ext (not necessarily efficient) such the following holds. Consider the following experiment:
• R * outputs the first message msg 1 .
• Extractor Ext on input msg 1 outputs x * 1 .
• Let x 0 2 , x 1 2 be two inputs such that f (x * 1 , x 0 2 ) f (x * 1 , x 1 2 ). Party S on input msg 1 and x b 2 , outputs the second message msg 2 .
• R * upon receiving the second message outputs a bit out.
• Output out.
We require that,
for some negligible function negl.
We now define semantic security against S. We insist that S should not be able to distinguish which input S used to compute its messages. Note that S does not get to see the output recovered by the receiver.
Definition (Semantic Security against Quantum S * ). Consider a secure function evaluation protocol for a functionality f between a sender S and a receiver R where R gets the output. We say that the secure function evaluation protocol satisfies semantic security against S * if for every adversarial QPT S * , the following holds: Consider two strings x 0 1 and x 1 2 . Denote by D b the distribution of the first message (sent to S * ) generated using x b 1 as R's input. The distributions D 0 and D 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Instantiation.
A secure function evaluation protocol can be built from garbled circuits and oblivious transfer that satisfies indistinguishability security against malicious receivers. Garbled circuits can be based on the hardness of learning with errors by suitably instantiating the symmetric encryption in the construction of Yao's garbled circuits [Yao ] with one based on the hardness of learning with errors [Reg ] . Oblivious transfer with indistinguishability security against malicious receivers based on learning with errors was presented in a recent work of Brakerski et al. [BD ] . Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma ([Yao , Reg , BD ] ). Assuming the quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists a quantum-secure function evaluation protocol for polynomial time classical functionalities.
. Lockable Obfuscation
We first recall the definition of circuit obfuscation schemes [BGI + ]. A circuit obfuscation scheme associated with the class of circuits C consists of the classical PPT algorithms (Obf, ObfEval) defined below:
• Obfuscation, Obf(1 λ , C): it takes as input the security parameter λ, circuit C and produces an obfuscated circuit C.
• Evaluation, ObfEval( C, x): it takes as input the obfuscated circuit C, input x and outputs y.
We are interested in program obfuscation schemes that are (i) defined for a special class of circuits called compute-and-compare circuits and, (ii) satisfy distributional virtual black box security notion [BGI + ]. Such obfuscation schemes were first introduced by [WZ , GKW ] and are called lockable obfuscation schemes. We recall their definition, adapted to quantum security, below.
Definition
(Quantum-Secure Lockable Obfuscation). An obfuscation scheme (Obf, ObfEval) for a class of circuits C is said to be a quantum-secure lockable obfuscation scheme if the following properties are satisfied:
• It satisfies the above mentioned correctness property.
• Compute-and-compare circuits: Each circuit C in C is parameterized by strings α ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , β ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) and a poly-sized circuit C such that on every input x, C(x) outputs β if and only if C(x) α.
• Security: For every polynomial-sized circuit C, string β ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) ,for every QPT adversary A there exists a QPT simulator Sim such that the following holds: sample α
Instantiation. The works of [WZ , GKW , GKVW ] construct a lockable obfuscation scheme based on polynomial-security of learning with errors (see Section . ). Since learning with errors is conjectured to be hard against QPT algorithms, the obfuscation schemes of [WZ , GKW , GKVW ] are also secure against QPT algorithms. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem ([GKW , WZ , GKVW ]). Assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors, there exists a quantum-secure lockable obfuscation scheme.
Secure Quantum Extraction Protocols
We define the notion of quantum extraction protocols below. An extraction protocol, associated with an NP relation, is a classical interactive protocol between a sender and a receiver. The sender has an NP instance and a witness; the receiver only has the NP instance. Roughly speaking, we require the property that there is a QPT extractor that can extract the witness from a semi-malicious sender (i.e., follows the protocol but is allowed to choose its own randomness) even if the sender is a QPT algorithm. In addition, we require the following property (zero-knowledge): the interaction of any malicious receiver with the sender should be simulatable without the knowledge of the witness. The malicious receiver can either be classical or quantum and thus, we have two notions of quantum extraction protocols corresponding to both of these cases.
In terms of properties required, this notion closely resembles the concept of zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) systems. There are two important differences:
• Firstly, we do not require any completeness requirement from the underlying interactive protocol.
• In ZKAoK systems, the prover can behave maliciously (i.e., deviates from the protocol) and the argument of knowledge property states that the probability with which the extractor can extract is negligibly close to the probability with which the prover can convince the verifier. In our definition, there is no guarantee of extraction if the sender behaves maliciously.
Definition
(Quantum extraction protocols secure against quantum adversaries). A quantum extraction protocol secure against quantum adversaries, denoted by qQEXT is a classical protocol between two parties, sender S and a receiver R and is associated with an NP relation R. The input to both the parties is an instance z ∈ L(R). In addition, the sender also gets as input the witness w such that (z, w) ∈ R. At the end of the protocol, the receiver gets the output w ′ . The following properties are satisfied by qQEXT:
• Quantum Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For every (z, w) ∈ R, for any QPT algorithm R * with private quantum register of size |R R * | p(λ), for any large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, there exists a QPT simulator Sim such that
• Semi-Malicious Extractability: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for every (z, w) ∈ L(R), for every QPT S * with private quantum register of size |R S * | p(λ), there exists a QPT extractor Ext (Ext 1 , Ext 2 ) (possibly using the code of S * in a non black box manner), the following holds:
Definition (Quantum extraction protocols secure against classical adversaries). A quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries cQEXT is defined the same way as in Definition except that instead of quantum zero-knowledge, cQEXT satisfies classical zero-knowledge defined below:
• Classical Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for every (z, w) ∈ R, for any classical PPT algorithm R * with auxiliary information aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , there exists a classical PPT simulator Sim such that
Quantum-Lasting Security. A desirable property of cQEXT protocols is that a classical malicious receiver, long after the protocol has been executed cannot use a quantum computer to learn the witness of the sender from the transcript of the protocol and its own private state. We call this property quantum-lasting security; first introduced by Unruh [Unr ]. We formally define quantumlasting security below.
(Quantum-Lasting Security). A cQEXT protocol is said to be quantum-lasting secure if the following holds: for any large enough security parameter λ ∈ N, for any semi-malicious classical PPT R * , for any QPT adversary A * , for any auxiliary information aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , for any auxiliary state of polynomially many qubits, ρ, there exist a QPT simulator Sim * such that:
QEXT Secure Against Classical Adversaries
In this section, we show how to construct quantum extraction protocols secure against classical adversaries. While such protocols can be constructed from assumptions such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), factoring etc., i.e., cryptographic assumptions that are broken by polynomialtime quantum attacks and additionally post-quantum secure cryptographic assumptions such as learning with errors (needed to argue quantum-lasting security), we show that rather surprisingly such protocols can be based solely on learning with errors.
Tools.
• Quantum-secure computationally-hiding and perfectly-binding non-interactive commitments, Comm (see Section . ).
• Noisy trapdoor claw-free functions { f k,b : X → D Y } k∈K ,b∈{0,1} (see Section . ).
• Quantum-secure secure function evaluation protocol SFE (SFE.S, SFE.R) (see Section . ).
Construction.
We present the construction of the quantum extraction protocol (S, R) in Figure  for an NP language L. Our extraction mechanism of committing to the shares of the values and later releasing only one of the shares is borrowed from [PW ] .
Lemma . Assuming the quantum security of Comm, SFE and NTCFs, the protocol (S, R) is a quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries for NP.
Proof.
Classical Zero-Knowledge. Let R * be a classical PPT algorithm. We first describe a classical simulator Sim such that R * cannot distinguish whether its interacting with S or with Sim.
Description of Sim.
• Until the SFE round, it behaves as the honest sender would,
from R * .
-For every i, j ∈ [k], it sends random bits w
• It then executes SFE with R * , associated with the two-party functionality F defined in Figure ; the input of Sim in SFE is ⊥.
F

Input of sender: c
, w
Input of receiver: sh
-Output ⊥ if the following does not hold: for every j, j ′ ∈ [k], we have (sh
• Otherwise, output w. We prove the following by a sequence of hybrids. For some arbitrary auxiliary information aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) ,
Hyb 1 : The output of this hybrid is View R * S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, aux) .
Hyb 2 : Consider the following sender, Hyb 2 .S, that behaves as follows:
. Hyb 2 .S: Sends (v 1 , . . . , v k ) uniformly at random. If R * aborts in this step, Hyb 2 .S aborts.
. If R * aborts in this step, Hyb 2 .S aborts.
. Hyb 2 .S: Sends w . R * : Opens up the commitments queried, sh
. If R * aborts in this step, Hyb 2 .S Input of sender: (z, w). Input of receiver: z
• R: For every i ∈ [k], choose a random bit b i ∈ {0, 1} and sample a random
• S and R run SFE, associated with the two-party functionality F defined in Fig 
, w and the input to SFE.R is
, continue the execution of the protocol as in Step .
. Hyb 2 .S: Keep rewinding (poly(k) times) to Step , until it is able to recover another commitment accepting transcript. A commitment accepting transcript is one for which all the commitments opened in Step are valid, i.e. that c . Hyb 2 .S: If (v 1 , . . . , v k ) and (v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ k ) are different in less than ω(log(k)) coordinates, then abort.
. If Hyb 2 .S has not aborted so far, let S be the set of indices at which both (v 1 , . . . , v k ) and
(
be the values recovered from the commitment accepting transcripts associated with bits v i and v
. Now, continue the execution of the protocol on the original thread; i.e., when the Hyb 2 .S queries (w 1 , . . . , w k ) and (v 1 , . . . , v k ).
The only difference between Hyb 1 and Hyb 2 is that Hyb 2 .S aborts on some transcripts; conditioned on Hyb 2 .S not aborting, the transcript produced by the receiver when interacting with S is identical to the transcript produced by Hyb 2 .S. We claim that the probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts, conditioned on the event that R * does not abort, is negligibly small.
Claim . Pr[Hyb 2 .S aborts|R * does not abort] negl(k)
Proof. To argue this, we first establish some terminology. Let p 1 be the probability with which R * produces a commitment accepting transcript and p 2 be the probability with which R * passes the NTCF condition check. We call the rewinding performed in Step to be "inner rewinding" and the the rewinding performed in Step to be "outer rewinding".
In the rest of the proof, we condition on the event that R * does not abort. Consider the following claims.
Claim . The probability that the number of outer rewinding operations performed is greater than k is negligible.
Proof. Note that the outer rewinding is performed till the point it can recover a transcript that passes the NTCF check. Since the probability that R * produces a transcript that passes the NTCF check is p 2 , we have that the expected number of outer rewinding operations to be (1 − p 2 ) + p 2 · 1 p 2 ≤ 2. By Chernoff, the probability that the number of outer rewinding operations is greater than k is negligible.
Claim . The probability that the number of inner rewinding operations performed is greater than k 2 is negligible.
Proof. Note that for every NTCF transcript, Comm is rewound many times until Hyb 2 .S can indeed recover another commitment-accepting transcript. For a given NTCF transcript, since the probability that R * produces a commitment accepting transcript is p 1 , we have that the expected number of inner rewinding operations to be (1 − p 1 ) + p 1 · 1 p 1 ≤ 2. And thus by Chernoff, for a given NTCF transcript, the probability that the number of inner rewinding operations is greater than k is negligible. Since the number NTCF transcripts produced is at most k with probability negligibly close to , we have that the total number of inner rewinding operations is at most k 2 with probability neglibly close to .
We now argue about the probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts on an NTCF transcript (Step ) and the probability that it aborts on the transcript of Comm (Step ).
Claim . The probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts in Step is negligible.
Proof. Note that Hyb 2 .S aborts in Step only if: (i) it received a valid transcript on the original thread of execution, (ii) it rewinds until the point it receives another valid NTCF transcript and, (iii) the challenge (v ′ 1 , . . . , v ′ k ) on which the second transcript was accepted differs from (v 1 , . . . , v k ) only in ω(log(k)) co-ordinates. Thus, the probability that it aborts is the following quantity:
differ in less than ω(log(k)) co-ordinates ]
differ in less than ω(log(k)) co-ordinates ] p 2 · negl(k) (By Chernoff Bound)
Proof. Since step is executed for multiple NTCF transcripts, we need to argue that for any of NTCF transcripts, the probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts in Step is negligible. Since we already argued in Claim that the number of inner rewinding operations is poly(k), by union bound, it suffices to argue the probability that for any given NTCF transcript, the probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts in Step is negligible. This is similar to the argument in Claim : the probability that Hyb 2 .S aborts in
Step is p 2 1 · 1
Observe that Hyb 2 .S only aborts in Steps and ; recall that we have already conditioned on the even that R * does not abort. Thus, we have the proof of the claim.
This claim shows that Hyb 1 and Hyb 2 are indistinguishable:
View R * S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, aux) ≈ c View R * Hyb 2 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, aux) .
Hyb 3 : In this hybrid, Hyb 3 .S will do as Hyb 2 .S except as follows: once it gets to step , if the NTCF check passes, it continues as usual, but if the NTCF check does not pass, it inputs ⊥ in the SFE.
The indistinguishability of Hyb 3 and Hyb 4 follows from the security of the SFE against malicious receivers, and we have: S(1 λ , z, w) , R * (1 λ , z, aux) , This is because the following holds in the event that the above check does not pass:
, w , sh
Hyb 4 : In this hybrid, Hyb 4 .S always inputs ⊥ in the SFE.
We have the following:
pass the NTCF checks corresponding to the i th instantiation. Moreover, recall that |T | ω(log(k)). This contradicts the security of NTCFs: by the adaptive hardcore bit property of the NTCF, a PPT classical adversary can break a given instantiation with probability negligibly close to / and thus, it can break ω(log(k)) instantiations only with negligible probability.
Hyb 5 : Now the hybrid sender, Hyb 5 .S does as Hyb 4 .S, but it does not rewind R * .
The statistical distance between Hyb 4 and Hyb 5 is negligible in k; this follows from Claim .
Extractability. Let S * be the semi-malicious sender. We define our quantum extractor Ext as follows.
Description of Ext. The input to Ext is the instance z.
• Run S * to obtain {k i } i∈ [k] .
• For all i ∈ [k], -Prepare the superpostion
which can be done efficiently by the required properties of NTCF.
-Measure the y register, to obtain outcome y i . Denote the postmeasurement quantum state by |Ψ i . By NTCF,
-Compute J into a new register, |b, x, 0 → |b, x, J(x) , and then uncompute the register containing x by performing J −1 , i.e. |b, x, J(x) → |b, x ⊕ J −1 (J(x)), J(x) . The resulting transformation is |b, x, 0 → |b, 0, J(x) .
-Discard the second register, and keep the first register containing b and the third register with J(x). At this point, the extractor has the states k] to S * , and let {v i } i∈[k] be the message received from S * .
• For all i ∈ [k]: 
• Perform the rest of the protocol as the honest receiver would. Output the outcome of the SFE protocol.
Claim . Assuming NTCFs, perfect correctness and security of SFE, the probability that Ext extracts from the semi-malicious sender ie negligibly close to 1.
Proof. We first claim that with probability negligibly close to , the following is satisfied for every v i ∈ [k]:
be the value obtained by applying the Hadamard transformation to |Ψ ′ i , and measuring it in the standard basis. Then
This follows from the union bound and Lemma . of the protocol of [BCM + ]. By perfect correctness of SFE, it follows that if the extractor inputs shares sh i,1 that answer correctly each challenge, the output it will receive from the SFE will be the witness w.
Claim . View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), R(1 λ , z) ≈ Q Ext 1 1 λ , S * , z, · Proof. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb 1 : The output of this hybrid is View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), R(1 λ , z) .
Hyb 2 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 2 .R who sets the input to SFE to be ⊥.
The following holds from the semantic security of SFE against QPT senders:
View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·) , R(1 λ , z) ≈ Q View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·) , Hyb 2 .R(1 λ , z)
Hyb 3 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 3 .R that behaves as Hyb 2 .R, but it samples { y i } i∈ [k] as the extractor would, by preparing the claw-free superpositions, and then measuring the y register. We claim that the distribution over y i 's is the same in Hyb 2 and Hyb 3 . To see this, note that Hyb 3 samples from the distribution y i from the distribution: 1
To sample from this distribution, we can first sample b ∈ {0, 1}, then an x i,b ∈ X and then sampling y i from the 
according to whether v i 0 or v i 1 respectively. In other words, Hyb 4 .R compute correct answers to the test of quantumness, then it commits to appropriate shares,
Hyb 4 .R uses these shares for commitment c
i,1 ) The rest of the steps are the same as Hyb 3 .R.
The following holds from the computational hiding property of Comm by a similar argument to the one in [PW ]: View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), Hyb 3 .R(1 λ , z) ≈ Q View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), Hyb 4 .R(1 λ , z)
Hyb 5 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 5 .R who sets the input in SFE to be sh
, where {w i } i∈ [k] are the bit queried by S * when asking the receiver to reveal commitments. Note that the output distribution of Hyb 5 .R is identical to that of the extractor Ext.
The following holds from the semantic security of SFE against quantum senders: View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·) , Hyb 4 .R(1 λ , z) ≈ Q View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·) , Hyb 5 .R(1 λ , z) ≡ Ext 1 1 λ , S * , z, · Handling Aborting Adversaries. We observe that we can show our construction to satisfy a stronger extractability property: the semi-malicious sender cannot distinguish whether its interacting with the extractor or the honest receiver even if it is allowed to abort. If at any point in time, the sender aborts, so does the extractor and note that from the same arguments as above, the view of the sender when interacting with the honest sender will still be indistinguishable (against a quantum polynomial time adversary) from the view of the sender when interacting with the extractor. We formalize this in the claim below.
Claim . The quantum extraction protocol (S, R) described in Figure satisfies extractability even when the semi-malicious sender is allowed to abort at any point during the execution of the protocol.
. Application: Classical ZK arguments secure against quantum verifiers
In this section, we show how to construct a quantum zero-knowledge, classical prover, argument system for NP secure against quantum verifiers; that is, the protocol is classical, the malicious prover is also a classical adversary but the malicious verifier can be a polynomial time quantum algorithm. To formally define this notion, consider the following definition.
Definition
(Classical arguments for NP). A classical interactive protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a classical ZK argument system for an NP language L, associated with an NP relation L(R), if the following holds:
• Completeness: For any (z, w) ∈ L(R), we have that Pr [ Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier(1 λ , z) 1] ≥ 1 − negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
• Soundness: For any z L, any PPT classical adversary Prover * , and any polynomial-sized auxiliary information aux, we have that Pr[ Prover * (1 λ , z, aux), Verifier(1 λ , z) 1] ≤ negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
We say that a classical argument system for NP is a QZK (quantum zero-knowledge) classical argument system for NP if in addition to the above properties, a classical interactive protocol satisfies zero-knowledge against malicious receivers.
Definition (QZK classical argument system for NP). A classical interactive protocol (Prover , Verifier) is a quantum zero-knowledge classical argument system for a language L, associated with an NP relation L(R) if both of the following hold.
• (Prover, Verifier) is a classical argument for L (Definition ).
• Quantum Zero-Knowledge: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For any QPT Verifier * that on instance z ∈ L has private register of size |R Verifier * | p(|z|), there exist a QPT Sim such that the following two collections of quantum channels are quantum computationally indistinguishable, -{Sim(z, Verifier * , ·)} z∈L -{View Verifier * ( Prover(z, aux 1 ), Verifier * (z, ·) )} z∈L .
In other words, that for every z ∈ L, for any bounded polynomial q : N → N, for any QPT distinguisher D that outputs a single bit, and any p(|z|) + q(|z|)-qubits quantum state ρ, Pr D Sim(z, Verifier * , ·) ⊗ I)(ρ) 1 − Pr D (View Verifier * ( Prover(z, aux 1 ) , Verifier * (z, ·) ) ⊗ I)(ρ) 1 ≤ ǫ(|z|)
Witness-Indistinguishability against quantum verifiers. We also consider witness indistinguishable (WI) argument systems for NP languages secure against quantum verifiers. We define this formally below.
Definition (Quantum WI for an L ∈ NP). A classical protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum witness indistinguishable argument system for an NP language L if both of the following hold.
• Quantum WI: Let p : N → N be any polynomially bounded function. For every z ∈ L, for any two valid witnesses w 1 and w 2 , for any QPT Verifier * that on instance z has private quantum register of size |R Verifier * | p(|z|), we require that View Verifier * ( Prover(z, w 1 ), Verifier * (z, ·) ) ≈ Q View Verifier * ( Prover(z, w 2 ), Verifier * (z, ·) ).
If (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum proof system (sound against unbounded provers), we say that (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum witness indistinguishable proof system for L.
Instantiation. By suitably instantiating the constant round WI argument system of Blum [Blu ] with perfectly binding quantum computational hiding commitments, we achieve a constant round quantum WI classical argument system assuming quantum hardness of learning with errors.
. . Construction
We present a construction of constant round quantum zero-knowledge classical argument system for NP.
Tools.
• Perfectly-binding and quantum-computational hiding non-interactive commitments Comm (see Section . ).
• Quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries cQEXT (S, R) associated with the relation R EXT as constructed in Section . More generally, cQEXT could be any quantum extraction protocol secure against classical adversaries as long as it satisfies Claim .
• Quantum witness indistinguishable classical argument of knowledge system Π WI (Π WI .Prover, Π WI .Verifier) for the relation R wi (Definition ).
Witness: w, (sh ( j)
NP verification: Accept if one of the following two conditions are satisfied:
• (z, w) ∈ R.
• If for every j ∈ [k], it holds that
Construction. Let L be an NP language. We describe a classical interactive protocol (Prover, Verifier) for L in Figure . Lemma . The classical interactive protocol (Prover, Verifier) is a quantum zero-knowledge, classical prover, argument system for NP.
Proof. The completeness is straightforward. We prove soundness and zero-knowledge next.
Soundness. Let Prover * be a classical PPT algorithm. We prove that Prover * (1 λ , z, aux) , for z L and auxiliary information aux, can convince Verifier(1 λ , z) with only negligible probability. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb 1 : The output of this hybrid is the view of the prover View Prover * ( Prover * (1 λ , z, aux), Verifier(1 λ , z) ) along with the decision bit of Verifier.
Hyb 2 : We consider the following hybrid verifier Hyb 2 .Verifier which executes the trapdoor commitment phase and the trapdoor extraction phase with Prover * honestly. It then receives {((c ( j) 0 ) * , (c ( j) 1 ) * ))} j∈[k] from the prover. Hyb 2 .Verifier sends random bits {b ( j) } j∈ [k] to Prover * and it then receives (sh
At this point, Hyb 2 .Verifier will rewind until it can extract td * from the commitments; if it extracted multiple values or it didn't extract any value, set td * ⊥. This is done similarly to the cQEXT case and the argument from [PW ].
The output distribution of this hybrid is identical to the output distribution of Hyb 1 . The following holds:
• Trapdoor Committment Phase: Verifier: sample td ← {0, 1} λ . Compute c ← Comm(1 λ , td; d) , where d ← {0, 1} poly(λ) is the randomness used in the commitment. Send c to Prover.
• Trapdoor Extraction Phase: Prover and Verifier run the quantum extraction protocol cQEXT with Verifier taking the role of the sender cQEXT.S and Prover taking the role of the receiver cQEXT.R. The input of cQEXT.S is (1 λ , c, d; r qext ) and the input of cQEXT.R is 1 λ , c , where r qext is the randomness used by the sender in cQEXT. Let the transcript generated during the execution of cQEXT be T Verifier→Prover . The trapdoor extraction phase will be used by the simulator, while proving zero-knowledge, to extract the trapdoor from the malicious verifier.
b ( j) ) to Verifier. • Verifier sends r qext , d, td to Prover. Then Prover checks the following:
, where the message m R i (resp., m S i ) is the message sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round and t ′ is the number of rounds of cQEXT. Let the message produced by S 1 λ , c, d; and witness (w, ⊥). The input to Π WI .Verifier is the security parameter 1 λ and instance
• Decision step: Verifier computes the decision step of Π WI .Verifier. :
We prove the following claims.
Claim . ε 1 ≤ negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
Proof. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb 3 : We define a hybrid verifier Hyb 3 .Verifier that performs the trapdoor commitment phase honestly. In the trapdoor extraction phase, it executes QEXT 1 .Sim(1 λ ), instead of QEXT 1 .S(1 λ , c, d) , while interacting with Prover * . The rest of the steps of Hyb 3 .Verifier is as defined in Hyb 2 .Verifier. Let td * be the trapdoor extracted as before. From the zero-knowledge property of cQEXT, the following holds: : td * ← Ext(1 λ , ρ aux ) ≤ negl(λ)
From the above hybrids, it follows that ε 1 ≤ negl(λ).
Claim . ε 2 ≤ negl(λ), for some negligible function negl.
Proof. Since the trapdoor td * extracted from Prover * is not equal to td, this means that there is a 
1 such that the commitments of (sh Zero-Knowledge. Let Verifier * be the malicious QPT verifier. We describe the simulator Sim as follows.
• It receives c from Verifier * .
• Suppose Ext be the extractor of cQEXT associated with cQEXT.S * , where cQEXT.S * is the adversarial sender algorithm computed by Verifier * . Compute Ext(1 λ , cQEXT.S * , ·) to obtain td * . At any time, if Verifier * aborts, Sim also aborts with the output, the current private state of Verifier * .
• For every j ∈ [k], it samples sh • It receives bits {b ( j) } j∈ [k] from Verifier * .
• It sends (sh
• It receives (r qext , d, td) from Verifier * . It then checks the following:
, where the message m R i (resp., m S i ) is the message sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round and t ′ is the number of rounds of cQEXT. Let the message produced by cQEXT.S 1 λ , c, d; r qext in the i th round be m S i . -If for any i ∈ [t ′ ], m S i m S i then Sim aborts. If td td * then Sim aborts.
We remind the reader that in every round, only one party speaks.
• Sim executes Π WI with Verifier * on input instance z, td, (c ( j)
. The witness Sim
. If Verifier aborts at any point in time, Sim also aborts and outputs the current state of the verifier.
• Otherwise, output the current state of the verifier.
We prove the indistinguishability of the view of the verifier when interacting with the honest prover versus the view of the verifier when interacting with the simulator. Consider the following hybrids.
Hyb 1 : The output of this hybrid is the view of Verifier * when interacting with Prover. That is, the output of the hybrid is View Verifier * Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) . ) to Verifier * . It then receives (r qext , d, td) from Verifier * . It then checks the following:
, where the message m R i (resp., m S i ) is the message sent by the receiver (resp., sender) in the i th round and t ′ is the number of rounds of cQEXT. Let the message produced by cQEXT.S 1 λ , c, d; r qext in the i th round be m S i .
• If for any i ∈ [t ′ ], m S i m S i then Sim aborts. If td td * then Sim aborts.
Hyb 2 .Prover finally executes Π WI with Verifier * ; it still uses w in Π WI . The following holds from the semi-malicious extractability property of cQEXT:
View Verifier * Prover(1 λ , z, w), Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View Verifier * Hyb 2 .Prover(1 λ , z, w), Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) This is because either cQEXT.S * is not semi-malicious in which case, simulator aborts and hence, conditioned on the event that indeed cQEXT.S * is semi-malicious, Ext can extract the witness with probability negligibly close to . Moreover, at any point in time if cQEXT.S * aborts, by Claim , we have that the state of Verifier * output by Sim is indistinguishable from the state of Verifier * when interacting with the honest prover. 
The following holds from the quantum-computational hiding property of Comm following the same argument as [PW ]:
View Verifier * Hyb 2 . Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View Verifier * Hyb 3 . Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) Hyb 4 : We define a hybrid prover Hyb 4 .Prover as follows: it behaves exactly like Hyb 3 .Prover except that it uses the witness (⊥, (sh ( j)
1 )) in Π WI instead of (w, ⊥). Note that the description of Hyb 4 .Prover is identical to the description of Sim.
The following holds from the quantum witness indistinguishability property of Π WI :
View Verifier * Hyb 3 . Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View Verifier * Hyb 4 . Prover(1 λ , z, w) , Verifier * (1 λ , z, ·) ≡ Sim(1 λ , z, ·)
QEXT Secure Against Quantum Adversaries .
Construction of QEXT
We present a construction of quantum extraction protocols secure against quantum adversaries, denoted by qQEXT. First, we describe the tools used in this construction.
Tools.
• Quantum-secure computationally-hiding and perfectly-binding non-interactive commitments Comm (see Section . ).
• Quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme with some desired properties, (qFHE.Gen, qFHE.Enc, qFHE.Dec, qFHE.Eval).
-It admits homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary computations, -It admits perfect correctness, -The ciphertext of a classical message is also classical.
We show in Section . that there are qFHE schemes satisfying the above properties.
• Quantum-secure two-party secure computation SFE with the following properties (see Section . ):
-Only one party receives the output. We designate the party receiving the output as the receiver SFE.R and the other party to be SFE.S.
-Security against quantum passive senders.
-IND-Security against quantum malicious receivers.
• Quantum-secure lockable obfuscation LObf (Obf, ObfEval) for C, where every circuit C, parameterized by (r, k, SK 1 , CT * ), in C is defined in Figure . Note that C is a compute-andcompare functionality (see Section . ).
C
Input: CT
Hardwired values: r, k, SK 1 , CT * .
• If r ′ r, output k. Else, output ⊥. 
• Otherwise, output ⊥. Construction. We construct a protocol (S, R) in Figure for a NP language L, and the following lemma shows that (S, R) is a quantum extraction protocol.
Lemma . Assuming the quantum security of Comm, SFE, qFHE and (S, R) is a quantum extraction protocol for L secure against quantum adversaries.
Proof.
Quantum Zero-Knowledge. Let (z, w) ∈ R, and let R * be a QPT malicious receiver. Associated with R * is the QPT algorithm Sim -in fact, Sim is a classical PPT algorithm that only uses R * as a black-box -defined below.
Description of Sim.
• It first receives c from R * . It performs the following operations:
-Compute the qFHE.Setup to obtain (PK 1 , SK 1 ). : (z, w) . Input of receiver: z 1} ℓ·poly(λ) . Compute c ← Comm 1 λ , (r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ; d) , where ℓ λ and d is the randomness used to compute c. Send c to S.
Input of sender
• S:
CT * is defined below and C[r, k, SK 1 , CT * ] is defined in Figure . * CT * ← qFHE.Enc (PK 2 , r)
• S and R run SFE, associated with the two-party functionality f defined in Figure ; S takes the role of SFE.S and R takes the role of SFE.R. The input to SFE.S is (td, c, c * 1 , . . . , c * ℓ , SK 2 ) and the input to SFE.R is (d, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ).
Figure : Quantum Extraction Protocol (S, R)
-Compute CT 1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , ⊥).
-Compute the obfuscated circuit C ← LObf.Sim 1 λ , 1 |C| .
Send (CT 1 , C, otp).
• It then receives (c * 1 , . . . , c * ℓ ) from the receiver.
• It executes SFE with R * ; Sim takes the role of SFE.S with the input ⊥.
• Finally, it outputs the final state of R * .
We show below that the view of R * when interacting with the honest sender is indistinguishable, by a QPT distinguisher, from the output of Sim. Consider the following hybrids:
Hyb 1 : In this hybrid, R * is interacting with the honest sender S. The output of this hybrid is the output of R * .
Hyb 2 : In this hybrid, we define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb 2 .S: it behaves exactly like S except that in SFE, the input of SFE.S is ⊥. Consider the following claim.
Claim . View R * S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View R * Hyb 2 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·) .
Proof. To prove this claim, we first need to show that the probability that the receiver R * commits to w is negligible. Consider the following claim.
Claim . Assuming the quantum security of Comm, LObf and qFHE, the following holds:
in C is generated as CT * ← qFHE.Enc(PK 2 , ⊥).
Assuming the quantum security of qFHE, we have: S(1 λ , z, w) , R * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View R * Hyb 3 .S (1 λ , z, w) , R * (1 λ , z, ·)
Hyb 4 : We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb 4 .S: it behaves exactly like Hyb 3 .S except that C is generated as C ← LObf.Sim 1 λ , 1 |C| . Assuming the quantum security of LObf, we have:
Hyb 5 : We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb 5 .S: it behaves exactly like Hyb 4 .S except that OT is generated uniformly at random. The following holds unconditionally:
View R * Hyb 4 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·) ≡ View R * Hyb 5 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·)
Hyb 6 : We define a hybrid sender, denoted by Hyb 6 .S: it behaves exactly like Hyb 5 .S except that CT 1 is generated as CT 1 ← qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , ⊥).
Assuming the quantum security of qFHE, we have:
View R * Hyb 5 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·) ≈ Q View R * Hyb 6 .S(1 λ , z, w), R * (1 λ , z, ·)
Since Hyb 6 .S is identical to Sim, the proof of quantum zero-knowledge follows.
Extractability. Let S * (S * 1 , S * 2 ) be a semi-malicious QPT, where S * 2 is the QPT involved in SFE. Denote by R (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) the PPT algorithms of the honest receiver. In particular, R 3 is the algorithm that the receiver runs in SFE protocol. Let E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * ) : R 3 (1 λ , d, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ), S * 2 (1 λ , td, w, c, c * , ·)
be the interaction channel induced on the private quantum input of S * by the interaction with R in the SFE protocol for the functionality f with inputs d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * . Without loss of generality, assume that this channel also outputs the classical message output of SFE. Consider the following extractor Ext, that takes as input the efficient quantum circuit description of S * (1 λ , z, w, ·) , and the instance z.
Ext(1 λ , S * , z, ·):
• Run R 1 to compute c, d, and r 1 , . . . , r ℓ .
• Apply the channel S * 1 (1 λ , z, w, c, ·).
• Let (CT 1 , C, otp) denote the classical messages outputted by S * 1 , and let ρ denote the rest of the state.
• With CT 1 , homomorphically commit to td, obtaining qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , c * : Comm(1 λ , td) ) .
• Encrypt (d, c, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ), and ρ, and homomorphically apply the channel E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c  *  ) • Let qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SFE.Out ⊗ ρ ′ ) be the output of the previous step, where SFE.Out is the classical output of the SFE protocol.
• Apply C to the qFHE encryption of SFE.Out. Note that we are assuming that classical messages have classical ciphertexts, so this computation is a classical one. Let k be the output of C (qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SFE.Out)).
• Let SK 1 : k ⊕ otp, and decrypt CT 1 with SK 1 . If the decryption is successful and the message w is recovered, let Ext 2 output w.
• Use SK 1 to decrypt the ciphertext qFHE.Enc(PK 1 , SFE.Out ⊗ ρ ′ ), and let Ext 1 output ρ ′ .
Claim . View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), R(1 λ , z) ≈ Q Ext 1 1 λ , S * , z, · Proof. Let R D be the quantum register of a distinguisher D. Let F : R D → R D be the following channels, parametrized by d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * , F (ρ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , w, c, c * ) : E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * ) • S * 1 (1 λ , z, w, c, ·) ⊗ Id ρ .
The identity is acting on the distinguisher's private state, and the composition E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * )• S * 1 (1 λ , z, w, c, ·) acts on the private state of S * . We do not write td as a parameter to F , because td is generated by S * 1 and assumed to be part of the sender's private state. We do add it as a parameter to E SFE to be consistent and to remind ourselves that the td is input into the SFE protocol.
Note that when d, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , c and c * are generated by the honest R in the protocol, we have F (ρ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , w, c, c * ) View S * S * (1 λ , z, w, ·), R(1 λ , z) ⊗ Id (ρ)
We will show that when d, r 1 , . . . , r ℓ , c are generated the same way as the honest R would generate them in the first round R 1 , but the commitment c * c * 1 , . . . , c * ℓ is a commitment to the witness, w, instead, we have F (ρ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , w, c, c * w ) Ext 1 1 λ , S * , z, · ⊗ Id (ρ)
Our goal is to show that these two cases, c * and c * w , are quantum computationally indistinguishable. To see why this last equation is true, we are using the perfect correctness of both the qFHE scheme and of the lockable obfuscator, as well as the fact that the S * is semi-malicious, which means it has to follow the protocol. This means that when S * 1 outputs (CT 1 , C, otp) , the extractor has a valid ciphertext CT 1 encrypted with a key PK 1 , which in turn is one-time padded, SK 1 ⊕k otp. Furthermore, the one-time pad value k is the output of C if an input releases the lock, and C is a correct lockable obfuscation of the desired circuit.
After this, the extractor performed E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c , c * w ) homomorphically, which results in the extractor having an encryption of SK 2 under PK 1 . This is true because the extractor is able to commit to the witness inside the encryption, and the semi-malicious sender has to engage correctly in the SFE. Since the extractor can now use the C to obtain SK 1 , we can summarize the whole operation of the extractor as follows. Let (CT 1 , C, otp) ⊗ ρ ′ be the state of the distinguisher after S * 1 . Then, the extractor performs ((Dec(SK 1 , ·) • Eval (E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , . .., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * w ) , ·) • Enc(PK 1 , c * w , ·)) ⊗ Id) ρ ′ By correctness of the qFHE scheme, this is the same as the extractor performing E SFE (· ; d, r 1 , ..., r ℓ , td, w, c, c * w ) • S * 1 (1 λ , z, w, c, ·) ⊗ Id ρ on the distinguisher's state.
To show that the view of the sender when interacting with the honest receiver is indistinguishable (against polynomial time quantum algorithms) from the view of the sender when interacting with the extractor.
Hyb 1 : The output of this hybrid is the view of the sender when interacting with the honest receiver.
Hyb 2 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 2 .R that behaves like the honest receiver except that the input of Hyb 2 .R in SFE is ⊥. The output of this hybrid is the view of the sender when interacting with Hyb 2 .R.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb 1 and Hyb 2 follows from the semantic security of SFE against quantum polynomial time adversaries.
Hyb 3 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 3 .R that behaves like Hyb 2 .R except that it sets c to be c Comm(1 λ , 0; d). The output of this hybrid is the view of the receiver when interacting with Hyb 3 .R.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb 2 and Hyb 3 follows from the quantum computational hiding of Comm.
Hyb 4 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 4 .R that sets c * i Comm(1 λ , td i ; r i ), for every i ∈ [ℓ]. The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb 3 and Hyb 4 follows from the quantum computational hiding of Comm.
Hyb 5 : We define a hybrid receiver Hyb 5 .R that behaves as Hyb 4 .R except that it sets c to be c Comm(1 λ , (r 1 , . . . , r ℓ ); d), where r i is the randomness used in the commitment c * i . The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb 4 and Hyb 5 follows from the quantum computational hiding of Comm.
Hyb 6 : The output of this hybrid is the output of the extractor.
The quantum indistinguishability of Hyb 5 and Hyb 6 follows from the semantic security of SFE against polynomial time quantum adversaries.
